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4

ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEES
COULD IGNORE THE MANDATORY NOTICE REQUIREMENT
OF ORDINANCE 21A.10.020

As explained on pages 4-7 of his opening Brief, Mr. McCowin does not base this appeal
on constitutional due process. The Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions
are not, however, the only sources of enforceable procedural rights. Rather, as this Court held in
West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358,1J8, 993 P.2d 252, legally binding due process
rights can also be created by a w4 City Code." Mr. McCowin's argument on appeal is that
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020' gave him the right to a non-deceptive notice of the November 2 hearing
regardless of whether that hearing threatened to deprive him of life, liberty or property. Mr.
McCowin respectfully submits that the district court erred by holding that if Mr. McCowin had
no ^'protectable property right for purposes of constitutional due process" then he had no right to
a non-deceptive hearing notice, notwithstanding Ordinance 21 A. 10.020. (R. at 551)2
The defendants never address Mr. McCowin's argument that Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 gave
him a statutory due process right to a non-deceptive hearing notice. It seems fair to presume that
they make no response to this argument because they have none.

Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 mandated that a hearing notice "shall be provided . . . to all
owners of the land . . . within eighty five feet (85') for certificates of appropriateness for
alterations and three hundred feet (300') for certificates of appropriateness for new construction."
2

The authorities cited in footnote 6 of Mr. McCowin's opening Brief raise an interesting
constitutional question: Even without Ordinance 21 A. 10.020, would Mr, McCowin have a
constitutional right to a hearing notice? Although interesting, this constitutional level of analysis
need not be reached. See West Valley City, 1999 UT App 358,1f8. Mr. McCowin asks only that
the mandatory notice requirement of Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 be enforced.
1

Instead of confronting the actual appeal argument, on pages 13-15 of their Brief, Messrs.
Rasmussen and Hammond make a "strawman" argument that Mr. McCowin had no
constitutionally protected property right in the outcome of the November 2 hearing, and therefore
no constitutional due process right to a non-deceptive hearing notice. Regardless of its merits,
this argument is irrelevant. As stated above, this appeal depends not upon constitutional due
process rights, but on the mandatory notice requirement of Ordinance 21 A. 10.020.
On page 14 of their Brief, Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond make the remarkable
assertion that "not a single ordinance" supports Mr. McCowin"s right to a non-deceptive hearing
notice. Given the clear applicability and mandatory terms of Ordinance 21 A. 10.020, the
defendants' assertion seems somewhat disingenuous.
II.

ON APPEAL, THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT THAT
THE BUILDING IS NOT A "GARAGE" AND THE HEARING
NOTICE WAS DECEPTIVE ARE PRESUMED TRUE

Mr. McCowin alleged in his Complaint that Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond's twostory building is substantially more than a "garage," that the hearing notice was deceptive, and
that defendants violated his right under Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 to a non-deceptive hearing notice.
(R. at 2-3) Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen refused discovery regarding their building (R. at
395, 425), but moved for dismissal. (R. at 359-362) On the basis of the fragmentary factual
record Mr. McCowin assembled without the benefit of discovery, the district court noted "serious
concerns regarding the adequacy of the 'notice' provided Plaintiff in this case." (R. at 551)
Nevertheless, the court ruled that it needn't resolve the fact disputes of whether the building was
a "garage" and whether the notice was deceptive. (R. at 551). Instead, the court adopted
defendants' legal argument that Mr. McCowin had no right to any notice (R. at 551-52), and

2

dismissed the Complaint without resolving the factual allegations of the Complaint.
The defendants now ask this Court to reject the factual allegations of the Complaint that
the building is in fact substantially more than a "garage" and that the hearing notice was
deceptive, and to affirm the district court on the ground that the hearing notice was not as a
matter of fact deceptive. Defendants would have this Court resolve disputes of fact that the
district court explicitly did not reach. (R. at 550-52) Throughout their respective briefs,
defendants call the building as a "garage," as if repetition made it so. On pages 15-18 of Messrs.
Hammond and Rasmussen's brief, they argue that (based upon the limited set of facts they have
chosen to disclose) this Court should find that the building is nothing more than a "garage."
Such factual argument can be directed to the fact-finder after discovery is completed. ^
However, on appeal from the district court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court
acceptfs] the factual allegations in the complaint as true and considers them, and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 UT 8, ^[2, 137 P.3d 706. For now, the allegations that the
building was not a garage and the hearing notice was deceptive are presumed true.4

J

On page 4 of its Brief, the City represents that it is "undisputed that the building
constructed by Rasmussen/Hammond is in fact a garage." Likewise, on page 17 of their Brief,
Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond represent that it is "undisputed that not just a portion of, but
the essential portion of Rasmussen/Hammond's garage is used to keep or store Rasmussen/
Hammond's cars." These representations lack any basis. Far from being "undisputed," these
issues were the central disputes before the district court. (R. at 395-96, 414-18, 424-27, 435-37)
4

In footnote 10 on page 17 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen cite two
Massachusetts cases that rejected challenges to administrative notices after trial on the facts. See
Carson v. Board of Appeals of Lexington, 75 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1947); Moore v. Cataldo, 249
N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1969). Neither of these cases can support an argument that Mr. McCowin's
claims were properly dismissed prior to any discovery and without findings of fact. Moreover,
the Carson plaintiffs were represented by counsel at the administrative hearing, 75 N.E.2d at 118;
3

III.

DEFENDANTS DO NOT SHOW AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND ON
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL MIGHT BE AFFIRMED
A.

There is not "Sufficient and Uncontroverted" Record Evidence Supporting
Defendants' Alternative Theories.

On pages 18-32 of their Brief Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen argue for affirmance on
four alternative theories.s However, as this Court held in State v. Montoya. 937 P.2d 145 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (and as Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen concede on page 20 of their Brief),
affirmance on an alternate e theory is only appropriate if that theory is "apparent on the record**;
that is, any alternative theory must be supported by "sufficient and uncontroverted" record
evidence. 937 P.2d at 149-150. This Court explained in Montoya that,
To hold otherwise would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus on issues
below, the effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had neither
notice of nor an opportunity to address.
937 P.2d at 149-150. Although three of defendants' four alternative theories were argued below,
by refusing discovery defendants denied Mr. McCowin "an opportunity to address" the factual
predicates of these theories. Mr. McCowin respectfully submits that the refusal of discovery has
resulted in a fragmentary factual record that is neither "sufficient" nor "uncontroverted," and that

therefore any deficiency in the notice had not succeeded in misleading them.
In footnote 12 on page 18 of their brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen cite Low v.
CitvofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, TJ 15, 103 P.3d 130, where a challenge to a city's notice was
rejected on summary judgment. Like the two Massachusetts cases, Low cannot support the
dismissal of Mr. McCowin" s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and prior to discovery. Moreover, the
Low plaintiffs admitted that the city's notice "complied with all statutes relevant to notice," but
argued that constitutional due process required more expansive notice than did the Utah statutes;
the Utah Supreme Court held that compliance with the statutory notice requirement satisfied due
process. 2004 UT 90, ^[18,19,21. In the instant case, Mr. McCowin asks only that the
mandatory notice requirement of Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 be enforced.
5

The City makes similar arguments on pages 5-6 of its Brief.
4

Montoya precludes affirmance on defendants' alternative theories.
The particular factual assertions with which defendants attempt to support their
alternative theories are addressed below in conjunction with those theories
B.

On the Facts Before the Court it Is Appropriate to Apph an Exception to
the Requirement That Administrative Remedies Be Exhausted
1.

Prior to discovery, the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be not
affirmed on the basis of an affirmative defense.

On pages 20-24 of their Brief Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen argue for affirmance on
the ground that Mr. McCowin failed to exhaust administrative remedies.6 Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is generally considered an affirmative defense. Mosely v. Board of
Educ. of City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111
(3rd Cir. 2002); In re Lymecare, Inc., 301 B.R. 662, 672 (Bkrtcy. D.N.J. 2003). Such affirmative
defenses "often raise issues outside of the complaint, [and therefore] are not generally
appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)." Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54 | 7 , 53 P.3d 947. Mr, McCowin submits that the same rule should apply to
defendants' argument that failure to exhaust administrative remedies provides an alternative
theory for affirming the district court's dismissal.
In Tucker, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that, "In some instances, however, the
existence of the affirmative defense may appear within the complaint itself" 2000 UT 54 TJ8, 53
P.3d 947. Mr. McCowin's Complaint contains one allegation relevant to administrative
remedies: In paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Mr. McCowin alleged that the City's deceptive
hearing notice "also frustrated the right to appeal the decision of the Salt Lake City Historic
6

The City makes a condensed version of the same argument on pages 6-7 of its Brief.
5

Landmark Commission to the Land Use Appeals Board." (R. at 5) Although this allegation is
clearly relevant to the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Mr,
McCowin submits that this single allegation is not alone sufficient to establish the affirmative
defense. Rather, whether or not dismissal of Mr. McCowin's Complaint can be affirmed for
failing to adequately exhaust administrative remedies depends upon issues of fact that do not
appear on the face of the pleading, and have yet to be explored in discovery.
2.

Defendants misstate the her son exceptions to the requirement that
administrative remedies be exhausted.

The Utah Supreme Court held in State Tax Com'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah
1989), that "[t]he law generally provides that parties must exhaust applicable administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review." In Mountain Fuel Supply v. Public Serv.
Com'n, 861 P.2d 414, 423-24 (Utah 1993), the court explained that, "Underpinning this doctrine
is the principle that before an error is considered on appeal, an agency should have the
opportunity to correct it." However, the Iverson recognized exceptions to this general rule
in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some
oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to
review the alleged grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would serve no
useful purpose.
782 P.2d at 524.7
On page 24 of their brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen assert that "the only time a

7

Although Iverson recognized these exceptions "in unusual circumstances," on page 20 of
their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen cite Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d
1234, 1237 (Utah 1980), for the rule that the Iverson exceptions are limited to "extraordinary
circumstances." Defendants apparently hope to raise that threshold from "unusual" to
"extraordinary." However, nothing in Johnson limits the Iverson exceptions to extraordinary
circumstances.
6

Utah appellate court has considered applying" the "oppression or injustice" exception articulated
in Iverson is in the context of a prisoner's habeas corpus petition. Defendants seem to have
forgotten that Iverson itself was a tax case. Defendants do not cite, and Mr. McCowin has not
found, any Utah law limiting the "oppression or injustice" branch of the Iverson exceptions to
habeas corpus cases.
As discussed in the following subsections, Mr. McCowin respectfully submits that the
present record contains neither "sufficient" nor "uncontroverted evidence to exclude the
application of the Iverson exceptions to the general requirement that administrative remedies be
exhausted. To the contrary, the facts before this Court raise inferences that both the "oppression
or injustice" exception and the "no useful purpose" exception are applicable.
3.

The record supports an inference that the hearing notice's
deception was material, deliberate, and effective.

It was alleged in the Complaint that the proposed building was in fact substantially more
than a garage, but that the City send out a deceptive hearing notice stating that only a "garage"
was to be considered. (R. at 2-3). Although there has not yet been discovery into the full extent
of this deception, there is already evidence that the deception was material and deliberate:
•

Prior to construction, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen filed a document with the City
representing that the total valuation of their building would be $20,000. (R. at 287) But
then they represented to the district court that they had already "invested over $50,000"
when the building was only partially complete. (R. at 371) Although defendants failed to
respond to discovery regarding the total cost of their building, Mr. McCowin filed his
own rough estimate that it "might be something in the neighborhood of $100,000." (R. at

7

404, 426) Defendants have never disputed this estimate.
Despite the magnitude of their building and the fact that it was to be newly constructed,
Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen filed their building application to the City on a form
reserved for "Major Alteration or Minor Construction." (R. at 134)
Mr. McCowin presented evidence to the district court regarding the City's apparent
practice of publishing administrative decisions on the City's web site only after the 30day period for administrative appeals has expired. (R. at 426-27)8
On page 9 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen represent as uncontroverted
that their building's second floor is merely Ctaa 6 Vi foot loft." Defendants made this same
assertion to the district court, attempting to understate the magnitude of the hearing
notice's deception. (R. at 369) Mr. McCowin disputed this assertion with the
defendants' own filings, which indicate that the second floor of their building has an
eleven or twelve foot vaulted ceiling. (R. at 396)9
On pages 9-10 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen represent as
uncontro verted that the City analyzed their building's "compatibility with the character of
the University Historic District. . . and its compliance with District design guidelines."

8

Mr. McCowin also informed the district court that he had an outstanding request to the
City to identify the date on which the results of the November 2, 2005, hearing were published to
the City's web site. (R. at 405, 426-27) The City delayed answering Mr. McCowin's request
until after the district court dismissed Mr. McCowin's Complaint, and then responded that the
results were not published until January 18, 2006 - more than a month after the 30-day period for
administrative appeals had expired. Although the City's response is not part of the record on
appeal, it is attached as Exhibit A hereto to indicate the type of information that would be
generated were discovery allowed to proceed in this case.
9

Their building's main floor has a 9 foot VA inch ceiling. (R. at 282)
8

They made this representation to the district court, attempting to minimize the
consequences of the deception. (R. at 369-370) Mr. McCowin disputed this assertion
with documentary evidence that the City had ignored its own mandatory architectural
design standards. (R. at 419-420, 261-266)
As alleged in the Complaint, the deceptive nature of the hearing notice prevented Mr.
McCowin from knowing that the building proposed by Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen was in
fact substantially more than a garage. (R. at 5) Mr. McCowin presented affidavit evidence to the
district court that he relied upon the false representation that only a "garage'' was proposed, and
because he had no objection to a "garage," elected not to attend the November 2 hearing. (R. at
5, 130) Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen concede on page 10 of the Brief that no other
homeowners within the University Historic District attended the November 2 hearing.
The City's Historic Landmark Commission approved the building at the close of the
November 2 hearing. (R. at 122) The City's Ordinance 21 A.34.020H.F.2.h. required any appeal
of that decision to be filed with the City's Land Use Appeals Board within 30 days, i.e., by
December 2, 2005. However, as alleged in the Complaint, Mr. McCowin did not have actual
notice that the building was substantially more than a "garage" until construction of its second
story and roof began, approximately July 15, 2006 - 8V2 after the building was approved and IV2
months after the 30 days for administrative appeals had lapsed. (R. at 5)
On the present record, there is no "sufficient and uncontroverted" evidence, Montoya,
937 P.2d at 432-24, excluding the "likelihood that some oppression or injustice" has occurred in
this case. Iverson, 782 P.2d at 524. To the contrary, accepting the factual allegations of the
Complaint, the hearing notice was deceptive. And even the present, incomplete record contains
9

evidence supporting inferences that the deception was material, that it was deliberate, and that it
effectively cut off Mr. McCowin* s right to participate in the November 2 hearing and to file a
timely administrative appeal. If these inferences are sustained when discovery is complete, Mr.
McCowin submits that it would be appropriate to apply the Iverson "oppression or injustice"
exception to the general requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.
4.

The Land Use Appeals Board, speaking through the Deputy
Director of the City's Department of Community Development,
refused Mr. McCowin's administrative appeal.

On pages 21-24 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen repeatedly assert that
Mr. McCowin "fail[ed] to even attempt to pursue an administrative appeal/' "never gave the
[administrative appeals body] a chance to review the [Historic Landmark] Commission's
decision," "deprived the [administrative appeals body] of the opportunity to hear" this case, etc.
Although the defendants make these assertions as if they were undisputably true, they are false.10
Mr. McCowin filed an affidavit with the district court documenting his attempt to initiate
an administrative appeal. (R. at 425-426) Mr. McCowin began to file a appeal to the City's
Land Use Appeals Board on the same day that he filed his Complaint. As he was doing so, Mr.
McCowin was introduced to, and had a lengthy meeting with, Mr. Brent Wilde, the Deputy
Director of the City's Department of Community Development. Mr. Wilde represented that he

10

As noted on page 9 above, the City's Ordinance 21 A.34.020H.F.2.h. defines the Land
Use Appeals Board as the administrative appeals body that is to hear appeals from decisions of
the Historic Landmark Commission. As explained in the following text, it was the Land Use
Appeal Board with which Mr. McCowin attempted to file an appeal, but which rejected that
appeal. Nevertheless, on pages 21-24 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen
repeatedly refer to a different administrative appeals body - the Board of Adjustment. It is
unclear whether the defendants' reference to this different administrative appeals body is simpl>
a mistake, or is an attempt to mislead this Court.
10

spoke on behalf of the Land Use Appeals Board. Mr. McCowin gave a copy of his Complaint to
Mr. Wilde, and explained the nature of his claim that the hearing notice was defective. Mr.
Wilde suggested that Mr. McCowin hold off on filing his administrative appeal while Mr. Wilde
ascertained whether the Board would even entertain the appeal. A few days later. Mr. Wilde
called Mr. McCowin and stated, purportedly on behalf of the City and the Land Use Appeals
Board, that Mr. McCowin's administrative appeal to the Land Use Appeals Board would be
rejected out of hand. Based upon Mr. Wilde statement that it would be futile to do so. Mr.
McCowin did not officially file an administrative appeal. (R. at 435-426)
Defendants" assertions that Mr. McCowin "deprived" the Land Use Appeals Board of the
opportunity to review this case are thus false. It was the Land Use Appeals Board - speaking
through Mr. Wilde - that refused to entertain Mr. McCowin's appeal. The Utah Supreme Court
held in Mountain Fuel Supply that the policy underpinning the general exhaustion requirement is
"that before an error is considered on appeal, an agency should have the opportunity to correct
it." 861 P.2d at 423-24. That policy has been vindicated in this case: the Land Use Appeals
Board had, and refused, the opportunity to correct the error of the deceptive hearing notice.
On page 23 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen cite the unpublished
opinion in McFadden v. Cache County Corp., 2006 UT App 256. The trial court in that case had
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies; the plaintiff appealed, arguing that summary judgment was
improper. Id *[j 1.! ] The plaintiff in McFadden argued that he should be excused from the general
exhaustion requirement because a person identified only as "an employee of Cache County" had
1

'For ease of reference, the paragraphs in McFadden have been serially numbered.
11

given him incorrect legal advice that "the Board does not review subdivision plat application
appeals and informed him not to complete or submit the appeal forms." Id ^[5. The McFadden
court did not hold that these circumstances could not support the application of one of the
Iverson exceptions; instead, this Court rejected the plaintiffs argument "because he concedes
that he did not rely on [the employee's] information in deciding not to appeal. Id ^|5.
This Court's opinion in McFadden is distinguishable from the instant case on a number of
grounds. First, the person with whom Mr. McCowin spoke, Mr. Brent Wilde, was not merel}
"an employee" of the City, but the Deputy Director of the City's Department of Community
Development. Second, Mr. Wilde did not provide incorrect legal advice, but represented that he
had ascertained that Land Use Appeals Board would reject Mr. McCowin's appeal out of hand.
Third, unlike the plaintiff in McFadden Mr. McCowin explicitly relied on Mr. Wilde's
representation in deciding not to officially file an administrative appeal. (It is noteworthy that the
City, which Mr. Wilde purported to represent, has never offered to dispute these facts.) Finally,
McFadden was in a different procedural posture: Affirmance of summary judgment in McFadden
does not support the defendants' argument that it was correct for the district court to dismiss Mr.
McCowin's Complaint under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) prior to discovery.
The fragmentary factual record before this Court does not contain "sufficient and
uncontroverted" evidence, Montoya, 937 P.2d at 432-24, excluding the appearance "that
exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." Iverson, 782 P.2d at 524. Rather, as discussed on
page 9 above, the deceptive hearing notice effectively misled Mr. McCowin for 8/4 months as to
the nature of Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen's building. When Mr. McCowin finally had
notice that the building was not a "garage" as had been falsely represented in the notice, the 3012

day period for administrative appeals had long since expired. It is not clear whether the Land
Use Appeals Board even had the authority to entertain an untimely administrative appeal.12 But
regardless of whether the Board could have entertained Mr. McCowin's administrative appeal,
speaking through Mr. Wilde, it stated that it would not do so. On this factual record, Mr.
McCowin submits that it would be appropriate to apply the Iverson %cno useful purpose"
exception to the general requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.
The Illinois Appellate Court dealt with similar facts in Grotto v. Little Friends, Inc., 432
N.E.2d 634 (111. App. 1982). A zoning agency had issued a decision without any notice, and the
plaintiff received no notice of the decision until the period for administrative appeal had lapsed.
The court held that failure to exhaust administrative remedies would not bar the plaintiffs action,
reasoning that
the administrative remedy . . . was, under these facts, unavailable to the plaintiffs,
and it would have been useless to pursue that remedy. . . . Equity will not require
the doing of a useless act.
432 N.E.2d at 636. See also Gardner v. Pierce County Bd. of Com'rs, 617 P.2d 743, 745 (Wash.
App. 1980) ("Where one has not enjoyed a fair opportunity to exhaust the administrative process
. .. exhaustion of administrative remedies will not be required.); Englemann v. Westergard, 647
P.2d 385, 388-389 (Nev. 1982) (same). Mr. McCowin submits that the remedy of administrative
review was effectively unavailable, and under the circumstances of this case the normal
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted should be waived.

12

Nothing in the City's Ordinances appears to authorize the Land Use Appeals Board to
grant extensions to the 30-day period for administrative appeals.
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C.

The deceptive hearing notice is not shielded by a ^statute of repose."

On pages 24-26 of their Brief. Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen argue that two statutes
- Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-209 and 10-9a-801 - should be construed to be "statutes of repose."
Defendants argue that if these statutes were so construed, then Mr. McCowin's claim was
absolutely barred 30 days after the date of the Historic Landmark Commission's decision. If the
Court were to accept defendants' argument, then regardless of any deliberate deception in a
hearing notice, as long as the deception were successfully maintained for just 30 days, it would
be forever thereafter shielded from challenge. Defendants do not cite, and Mr. McCowin has not
found, any judicial opinion construing either of these statutes to reach this harsh result, nor does
the statutory language support such a construction.
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). the Utah Supreme
Court held that,
A statute of repose generally "set[s] a designated event for the statutory period to
start running and then provide[s] that at the expiration of the period any cause of
action is barred regardless of usual reasons for lolling' the statute."
681 P.2d at 219, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, comment g (1979). In Raithaus v.
Saab-Scandia of America, 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the
distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose: Statutes of limitations
i;

require[] a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a legal right has been

violated," while statutes of repose require lawsuits to be filed within "a specified period of time .
. . from the occurrence of some event other than the injury which gave rise to the claim." 784
P.2dat 1160 (emphasis added). See also In re Marriage of Kunz, 136 P72d 1278, 1283-84 (Utah
App. 2006) (The defining feature of a statute of repose is that its time period "runs from the
14

occurrence of a specific event. . . [that] is not related to any injury or legal right."). These Utah
cases contradict the argument that section 10-9a-801 or section 10-9a-209 is a statute of repose.
Although section 10-9a-801 defines a 30-day period within which a claim must be filed,
this period commences on the date of the "final decision" b\ which the complainant is "adverseh
affected." Thus, its 30-day time period runs from the date of injury, and section 10-9a-801 is
therefore a statute of limitations, and not a statute of repose. Ironically, on page 26 of their Brief.
Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen cite Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 100 P.3d
171. where the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code Ann. section 10-9-1001 defined a "30day limitations period," not a repose period. Section 10-9-1001 is the predecessor to. and
substantially identical with section 10-9a-801. Therefore, contrary to defendants' arguments,
section 10-9a-801 need not be construed as a statute of repose.
Unlike section 10-9a-801, section 10-9a-209 does not define a time period within which a
cause of action must be asserted. Section 10-9a-209 therefore appears to be neither a statute of
limitations nor a statute of repose. See Pioneer Wholesale, 681 P.2d at 219. Rather, section 109a-209 provides that,
If notice given under authority of this part is not challenged under Section 10-9a801 within 30 days after the meeting or action for which notice is given, the notice
is considered adequate and proper.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-209. The obvious purpose of this statute is to raise a presumption of
adequacy and propriety if a notice is not challenged within 30 days of the "meeting or action for
which the notice is given." However, there is no Utah case law construing this statute, and the
details of its application are unclear. Defendants will obviously argue that the presumption
raised by this statute is irrebuttable, that 30-day period cannot be equitably tolled, and therefore
15

that the statute functions as an absolute statute of repose. However, there are at least three
reasons that section 10-9a-209 should not be so construed.
First, if the legislature had intended an irrebuttable presumption, it could easily have used
language such as, "the notice shall be irrebuttably presumed to be . . . .** Instead the legislature
used the less specific language, v is considered. . . .** In Board of Ed. v. Cunningham, 317
N.W.2d 638, 641 (Ct. App. Mich. 1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals construed a similar
phrase - "will be considered** - as raising only a rebuttable presumption. Mr. McCowin submits
that construing section 10-9a-209 as raising only a rebuttable presumption is appropriate in this
case, given the allegations of the Complaint that the hearing notice was deceptive and given the
indications in the existing record that the deception was deliberate.
Second, as illustrated by the present case, a person challenges the adequacy of a notice
only if he or she claims to have been injured by an inadequately noticed "meeting or action for
which the notice is given.'* Therefore, like a statute of limitations, but unlike a statute of repose,
section 10-9a-209 defines a period of time that runs from the date "a legal right has been
violated." Raithaus, 784 P.2d 784 P.2d at 1160. Section 10-9a-209 is therefore analogous to a
statute of limitation rather than a statute of repose, and as such would be subject to the equitable
tolling discussed in the next section.
Third, if section 10-9a-209 were construed as a statute of repose that shields deliberate
fraud after only 30 days, it would violate the Open Courts provision of Article I, section 11 of the
Utah Constitution. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court struck down a statute of repose, holding that the legislature cannot cut off an injured
person*s right of action unless (1) it provides "an effective and reasonable alternative remedy wby
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due course of law,'" or (2) "there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreason means for achieving the
objective." 717 P.2d at 680. Mr. McCowin submits that if section 10-9a-209 were construed as
a statute of repose, it would not pass muster under the Berry standard.
D.

The statutes of limitations are tolled by the equitable discovery rule.

On pages 27-31 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen argue that the district
court's dismissal of Mr. McCowin's Complaint can be affirmed on the alternative ground that his
claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.13 However, the defendants' limitations
argument ignores the allegations of the Complaint and misstates Utah's equitable discovery rule.
The Utah Supreme Court noted in Tucker that if all of the elements of a statute of
limitations defense appear on the face of a complaint, then that complaint is subject to dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 2002 UT 53, f 8, 53 P.2d 947. However, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is inappropriate if the complaint alleges "defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct" sufficient to make out a prima facie showing under Utah's equitable discovery rule.
Russell Packard Development Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, Tfl[ 25, 38. 39. 108 P.3d741. In
Russell Packard, the Utah Supreme Court held that,
When a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment, a
plaintiff will be charged with constructive notice of the facts forming the basis of
a cause of action only at that point at which a plaintiff, reasonably on notice to
inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing, would have, with due diligence, discovered
the facts forming the basis for the cause of action despite the defendant's efforts to
conceal it. . . . [This] is a highly fact-dependent legal question[] that is necessarily
a matter left to trial courts and finders of fact. .. [and] necessitates the type of
factual findings which preclude [judgment as a matter of law] in all but the
clearest of cases.

13

The City makes similar arguments on pages 5-6 and 7-8 of its Brief.
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id. atffll38-39 (internal citations omitted).
On page 28 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen assert that Mr. McCowin
has not made out a prima facie showing of the concealment because he "cannot assert, in good
faith, that calling the 'garage' a 'garage' was an affirmative step to intentionally conceal his
cause of action." In making this assertion, defendants once again forget that on this appeal from
a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the factual allegations of the Complaint are accepted as
true. Russell Packard 2005 UT 14, f34, 108 P.3d 741. According to the Complaint, the building
is substantially more than a "garage," and the misrepresentation in the hearing notice that it was
nothing more than a "garage" was an affirmative act of concealment.
On page 28 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen assert that "there is no
evidence that anyone took affirmative steps to conceal." It is true, of course, that there has been
no discovery and the factual record is rather thin. This underscores the impropriety of dismissing
under Rule 12(b)(6) prior to discovery. But even on the incomplete record, the district court
expressed "serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the 'notice' provided Plaintiff in this
case." (R. at 551) Moreover, there is evidence that Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen
misrepresented the value of their building as only $20,000 when it would cost something in the
neighborhood of $100,000. (See discussion on page 7 above.) And there is a preliminary
indication that the City may have withheld internet publication of its decision until after the 30day limitations period had passed. (See discussion on page 8 above.) Although these factual
issues need to be further developed through discovery, Mr. McCowin submits that even on the
existing record he has made out a prima facie case of concealment.
On pages 29-30 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen assert that even if Mr
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McCowin has made a prima facie showing of concealment, as a matter of law he was on inquiry
notice regarding the actual magnitude of their building. However, defendants mistakenly base
this argument on paragraph 37 of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Russell Packard, 2005
UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 J4 The Utah Supreme Court stated that the sort of inquiry notice discussed
in this paragraph 37 does not apply to the concealment version of equitable estoppel:
The problem with Defendants' argument is that, contrary to their assertions,
inquiry notice operates differently "when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took
affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action."
Id. 1f38, quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996). The appropriate version of
constructive notice is stated in paragraphs 38 and 39 of Russel Packard, 2005 UT 14, ^f 38-39,
108 P.3d 741, and is quoted in relevant part on page 17 above. As was held by the Utah Supreme
Court, this version of constructive notice "necessitates the type of factual findings which
preclude [judgment as a matter of law] in all but the clearest of cases." Id. f 39, quoting Berenda.
914 P.2d at 54. Mr. McCowin respectfully submits that the rule articulated in Russell Packard
precludes affirmance of the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground of limitations.
E.

Mr. McCowin has standing.

On pages 31 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen assert that although their
building is immediately catty-corner from Mr. McCowin's home, and despite record evidence of
the distinctive negative impact their building has upon his property (R. at 131-32), nevertheless,
Mr. McCowin has not suffered any injury that is not equally shared "by every landowner in the
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On page 29 of their Brief, Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen cite to paragraph 37 of
Russell Packard. On page 6 of its Brief, the City quotes from First American Title Insurance Co.
v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 1998); the Utah Supreme Court included this same
quotation in paragraph 37 of its opinion in Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, |37, 108 P.3d 741.
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district." And therefore, Mr. McCowin lacks standing to object to their building or the deceptive
hearing notice. If immediately surrounding home owners have no standing to object to an
illegally permitted and architecturally inappropriate building, then apparently no one has standing
to object. The defendants" position regarding standing is consistent with their position regarding
who is legally entitled to a hearing notice - apparently no one.
This standing argument fails for two reasons. First, in Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd..
2005 UT 82, ^f 15, 128 P.3d 1151, the Utah Supreme Court held that standing is established b\
'injury dissimilar from that suffered by the public generally." The Johnson court cited Harris v.
Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that "special damages need
not be different than the general public but, at a minimum, more substantial than those suffered
by the general public." Although the defendants' building injures the entire University Historic
District, its impact upon immediately surrounding homeowners such as Mr. McCowin is "more
substantial" than that upon the historic district in general.
The second flaw in defendants' standing argument is that the City's ordinances recognize
the particular interests of immediately surrounding homeowners. Although hearings of the
Historic Landmark Commission are theoretically open to anyone, Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 requires
that hearing notices be sent to a subcategory of surrounding homeowners "within eighty five feet
(85f) for certificates of appropriateness for alterations and three hundred feet (300f) for
certificates of appropriateness for new construction." As one of only 5 homeowners whose
property immediately surrounds Messrs. Hammond and Rasmussen's building, and as a member
of the subcategory of homeowners within the University Historic District who were legally
entitled to a non-deceptive hearing notice, Mr. McCowin has standing.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, appellant Steven McCowin respectfully asks that the
judgment of the district court be reversed, and that this matter be remanded so that the parties can
complete discovery regarding disputed matters of fact.
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EDWIN P. RUTAN, II
CITY ATTORNEY

PUTY CITY ATTORNEY

November 2, 2006
Steven E. McCowin
435 South 1200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

Information Requested

Dear Mr. McCowin:
This letter is in response to your letter dated October 3, 2006 and in response to your
subsequent telephone call on approximately October 25, 2006. In your letter and your voicemail
message, you requested certain public information from the City. This letter is in response to
those requests.
1.
A list of the members of the Salt Lake City Historic Landmark Commission
("HLC") as of November 2005 is enclosed.
2.
The list provided identifies which HLC members reside in the University Histonc
District. Other than their place of residence, the City has no way of knowing which HLC
members may own property in the University Historic District. That information could be
obtained, however, from the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
3.
The minutes from the November 2, 2005 HLC meeting were put on the City's
website on January 18, 2006.
4.
The City issued a Certificate of Appropriateness for the garage at 430 South
Douglas Street on May 16, 2002. The building permit was issued on October 28, 2002.
5.
enclosed.

An audio CD of the minutes from the October 4, 2006 HLC meeting is also

Unless you inform me otherwise, I will assume that this letter adequately responds to
your requests.
Sincerely yours, ,/J

^

/Lynn H. race

Encl.
451 SOUTH STATE STREET, ROOM 505, SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
TELEPHONE 801-535-7788

FAX 801-535-7640

